COMMENTS

Is Drug Quantity an Element of 21 USC § 841(b)?
Determining the Apprendi Statutory Maximum
Lindsay Calkinst
INTRODUCTION

Over twenty-seven thousand defendants are charged with federal
drug trafficking offenses each year.' The principal trafficking statute,
21 USC § 841, sets out a schedule of imprisonment and fines based on
the amount of drugs that was manufactured, distributed, or possessed.!
Currently, there is a circuit split over whether drug quantity in § 841 is
a sentencing factor, and therefore may be found by a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence, or whether drug quantity is an offense
element that must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Historically, the distinction between sentencing factors and
offense elements has been difficult for courts to draw. Congress and
state legislatures did not always specify which components of an
offense they intended to imbue with additional trial rights.! For
example, if a statute assigns a fifteen-year maximum penalty for
carjacking with a firearm, but assigns a twenty-five-year maximum
penalty for that same offense if serious bodily injury occurred, does
the prosecutor need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that serious
injury occurred?' Or can a judge find that fact at sentencing? Courts
have struggled to determine the answer. In Apprendi v New Jersey,'
the Supreme Court set out the bright-line rule that any fact other than
a prior conviction that increased the penalty for a crime beyond the
statutory maximum had to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.6
AB 2005, Princeton University; JD Candidate 2011, The University of Chicago Law School.
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics, 2008 table 4.1, online at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pubhtml/fjsst/2008/fjsO8st.pdf (visited May 7,2011).
2
21 USC § 841(b).
3
See Jones v United States, 526 US 227,232 (1999).
4
See id at 230-31.
5 530 US 466 (2000).
6
Id at 490.
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Circuit courts' interpretations of § 841 indicate that the Apprendi
"rule" is far from clear, however. Six circuits have held that drug
quantity is an element of § 841(b), because the maximum potential
sentence to which a defendant is exposed increases as the amount of
drugs in question does.! In contrast, five circuits have held that drug
quantity is not an element of § 841,' for two primary reasons. First,
they state that no Apprendi violation has occurred unless a
defendant's actual sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.' Second,
they explain that drug quantities in § 841 trigger mandatory
minimums, rather than higher statutory maximums only.o The
Eleventh Circuit, concurring in the conclusion that drug quantity is
not an element, bypassed the question of statutory minimums and
held that drug quantity is an element only when the actual sentence
imposed is above the statutory maximum set out in the applicable
portion of § 841(b)."
This circuit split implicates the central holding in Apprendi, a
landmark case in federal sentencing. A resolution in favor of the first
cluster of circuits would expand the scope of Apprendi, while a
resolution favoring the second cluster would substantially limit
Apprendi's applicability. While much has been written about
Apprendi, the two ways of interpreting the rule have never been noted
or examined. It is important to reconcile the circuit split, as Apprendi
controls fundamental aspects of criminal procedure, including
defendants' constitutional rights.
This Comment argues that drug quantity should be treated as an
element of § 841 for three reasons. First, the Supreme Court has
indicated after Apprendi that elements are not only those facts that
cause a defendant's actual sentence to exceed the statutory maximum,
but also those facts that increase the range of penalties to which a
7 See United States v Gonzalez, 420 F3d 111, 123, 133-34 (2d Cir 2005); United States v
Velasco-Heredia,319 F3d 1080, 1085 (9th Cir 2003); United States v Promise, 255 F3d 150,156-57
(4th Cir 2001); United States v Fields, 242 F3d 393, 395-96 (DC Cir 2001) (vacating the
defendants' sentences based on the conclusion that quantity is an element); United States v
Doggett, 230 F3d 160,164-65 (5th Cir 2000); United States v Hinshaw, 235 F3d 565,575 (10th Cir
2000). These cases are discussed in Part III.
8
See United States v Clark, 538 F3d 803, 812 (7th Cir 2008); United States v Franco,
484 F3d 347, 356-57 (6th Cir 2007) (holding that the defendant's actual sentence was below the
statutory maximum in § 841(b)(1)(C), so no Apprendi violation had occurred); United States v
Serrano-Lopez,366 F3d 628,638 & n 9 (8th Cir 2004); United States v Goodine,326 F3d 26,27-28
(1st Cir 2003); United States v Leachman, 309 F3d 377, 383 (6th Cir 2002) (holding that drug
quantities in § 841 increase statutory minimums rather than maximums); United States v
Vazquez, 271 F3d 93,98 (3d Cir 2001).
9 See, for example, Clark, 538 F3d at 811-12.
10 See, for example, United States v Washington, 558 F3d 716,720 (7th Cir 2009).
11 See United States v Underwood,446 F3d 1340,1345 (11th Cit 2006).
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defendant is exposed.12 Circuit courts that have held that drug quantity
is a sentencing factor either were writing before this recent
clarification from the Court or wrote afterward and ignored it.
Second, the same circuits ignore or bypass Supreme Court precedent
disfavoring the technique of statutory mixing and matching, where a
drug quantity can trigger a statutory minimum from one provision of
the statute while retaining the statutory maximum from another.
Finally, both sets of circuit courts have overlooked several instances
where the Supreme Court has used components of its traditional test
for distinguishing elements from sentencing factors in examining the
role of drug quantity in § 841(b). Combined, these three lines of
analysis reveal that drug quantity should be an element rather than a
sentencing factor.
Part I of this Comment provides background on the distinction
between sentencing factors and offense elements. Part I also
introduces the statute at issue, 21 USC § 841. Part II explains
Apprendi itself, along with Harris v United States," which held that
statutory minimums could be triggered by facts that had not been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 Part II also discusses United
States v Booker," which expands on the holding in Apprendi in the
context of § 841. Part III describes and analyzes the current split in the
circuit courts. This circuit split is characterized by two differences: first,
courts disagree over whether Apprendi applies only to actual
sentences that exceed statutory maximums or whether Apprendi
protections also attach to potential sentences that may exceed those
maximums. They also disagree over whether the mandatory maximum
sentence from one subsection of § 841 can be paired with a mandatory
minimum sentence from another subsection.
Finally, Part IV argues that circuit courts should treat drug
quantity as an element of § 841. That approach is more consistent with
the Supreme Court's own application of Apprendi, and it reflects what
the Court itself would likely hold. Part IV.A demonstrates that the
Supreme Court applies Apprendi to both actual and potential
sentences. Part IV.B shows that the Court has also indicated that
statutory maximums should be linked to the minimum sentences
within the same subsections. Then, in Part IV.C, this Comment
illustrates that even under the traditional five-factor test that the

12 See Cunningham v California, 549 US 270, 293 (2007); United States
v Booker,
543 US 220,230 (2005); Harris v United States, 536 US 545,568 (2002).
13 536 US 545 (2002).
14 Id at 568.
15 543 US 220 (2005).
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Supreme Court uses to distinguish elements from sentencing factors,
drug quantity would be treated as an element.
I. BACKGROUND

In criminal procedure, the distinction between offense elements
and sentencing factors is crucial: when a fact is designated as an
offense element, it must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. Sentencing factors, however, can be found by a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence." At the federal level, Congress
establishes the elements of each offense."' But Congress does not
always articulate which facts are offense elements and which are
sentencing factors." This leaves the determination to courts. Knowing
whether a fact will be submitted to a jury has a tremendous impact on
both prosecution and defense strategy; revealing the type of

weapon-or the quantity of drugs-present during an offense can
prejudice, or benefit, a defendant."o Accordingly, the Supreme Court
has given concrete guidance about whether a fact should be an
element or a sentencing factor, absent a clear indication from

Congress. This Section outlines this multi-factor method and then
introduces 21 USC § 841.
A. The Traditional Five Factors
The Supreme Court has used five primary categories to

determine whether Congress intended to render a fact an element or a
sentencing factor: (1) historical use, (2) statutory structure, (3) the
degree to which a punishment would be increased, (4) legislative

See In re Winship, 397 US 358,364 (1970).
See McMillan v Pennsylvania,477US 79,86 (1986).
18 See Liparota v United States, 471 US 419,424 (1985) ("The definition of the elements of
a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which
are solely creatures of statute."). See also John S. Baker Jr, Reforming Corporations through
Threats of Federal Prosecution,89 Cornell L Rev 310,311 (2004). But see Ben E. Rosenberg, The
Growth of FederalCriminal Common Law, 29 Am J Crim L 193,194 (2002) (arguing that federal
criminal common law is growing because of broadly worded statutes).
19 See Jones v United States, 526 US 227, 232 (1999) (explaining that the distinction
between elements and sentencing factors was crucial but that not every statute clearly specified
which components of the offense were sentencing factors). See also Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a
Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?):The Challenge of the Special Part,2 Buff Crim L Rev 297,
318-19 (1998); Benjamin J. Priester, Sentenced for a "Crime" the Government Did Not Prove:
Jones v. United States and the ConstitutionalLimitations on Factfinding by Sentencing Factors
Rather Than Elements of the Offense, 61 L & Contemp Probs 249,251-52 (Autumn 1998).
20 See Jacqueline E. Ross, UnanticipatedConsequences of Turning Sentencing Factors into
Offense Elements: The Apprendi Debate,12 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 197,198 (2000).
16
17
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history, and (5) potential unfairness." Before Apprendi, the Court had
not specifically articulated this test as such; rather, its method had
emerged through various cases considering the element-sentencing
factor distinction.
First, the Court has examined historical use. In Castillo v United
States," the defendants were members of the Branch-Davidian sect
whose compound was seized by federal agents in Waco, Texas, in
1993." They were indicted for conspiracy to murder federal officers
and faced an enhanced sentence under 18 USC § 924(c) for carrying a
firearm during or in relation to a crime of violence (in this case, the
conspiracy to murder). If the firearm were a machine gun, the statute
raised the mandatory minimum sentence from five years to thirty
years." The Court was faced with the question whether the fact of
carrying a machine gun was an offense element that had to be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Explaining that it was an element, the
Court stated that weapon type was not traditionally a sentencing
factor, unlike offender characteristics or the manner in which a basic
offense was carried out. The traditional-use factor therefore favored
treatment as an element.2 In Almendarez-Torres v United States,27 the
defendant had been charged with violating 8 USC § 1326(a), which
prohibited reentry to the United States after deportation and assigned
a two-year maximum sentence. Subsection (b) of the statute
authorized a maximum sentence of twenty years for reentry after a
deportation following conviction for an aggravated felony. The Court
explained that the recidivism enhancement could be a sentencing
factor, looking to past opinions that had explained prior convictions'
lack of connection to the underlying offense.' Traditional usage
favored treating recidivism as a sentencing factor.
In addition to historical use, the Supreme Court has looked to
statutory structure.2 In Castillo, for example, the Court used the
21 See United States v O'Brien, 130 S Ct 2169,2175-80 (2010). Before Apprendi, the Court
also considered constitutional avoidance, the cannon of construction under which an ambiguous
statute will be interpreted so as not to implicate important constitutional questions. See Jones,
526 US at 243 & n 6. But Apprendi, as will be explained in Part II of this Comment, ruled
squarely on the constitutional avoidance question by requiring any factor that increased the
penalty for a crime to be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Apprendi, 530 US at 490.
22 530 US 120 (2000).
23 Id at 122.
24 Id. See also 18 USC § 924(c) (1988 & Supp 1993).
25 Castillo,530US at 122.
26 Id at 123,126.
27 523 US 224 (1998).
28 Id at 226-27,243-44. See also Jones, 526 US at 235.
29 See, for example, McMillan, 477 US at 85-86.
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structure of the statute itself as evidence of the legislature's intent to
make carrying a machine gun an element rather than a sentencing
factor. It explained that the element "uses or carries a firearm" was
included in the same opening sentence as the word machine gun,
instead of being "broken up with dashes or separated into
subsections."" The Court also emphasized that there were three
sentencing-specific provisions after the provision setting out the
elements of the two crimes:
The next three sentences of § 924(c)(1) (which appear after the
sentence quoted above ... ) refer directly to sentencing: the first
to recidivism, the second to concurrent sentences, the third to
parole. These structural features strongly suggest that the basic
job of the entire first sentence is the definition of crimes and the
role of the remaining three is the description of factors (such as
recidivism) that ordinarily pertain only to sentencing.
The Court explained that whether Congress intended a fact to be
treated as an element or a sentencing factor was often apparent in the
statutory structure and by whether a fact was included in the same
sentence with the underlying offense. (In this case, the machine gun
enhancement appeared in the first sentence, with the "definition of the
crime" itself.)" In Jones v United States," three defendants were
charged with carjacking, in violation of a statute that carried a
maximum penalty of fifteen years in prison." The maximum penalty
increased to twenty-five years if serious bodily injury occurred during
the crime." The Court explained that separate statutory provisions
within the same offense section would generally indicate the presence
of sentencing factors rather than elements of a separate offense.1 The
Jones Court rejected this general interpretation of statutory
construction, holding that other considerations pointed to the
conclusion that the subsections each constituted separate elements of
new offenses rather than sentencing factors."
The third factor that the Court has analyzed is the degree to which
the fact in question increases the potential penalty for a crime. The
30

Castillo, 530 US at 124-25. The provision at issue read: "Whoever ... uses or carries a

firearm, shall ... be sentenced to ... five years ... and if the firearm is a [machine gun] ... to ...

thirty years." Id at 122.
31 Id at 125.
32 See id at 124-25.
33 526 US 227 (1999).
34 See id at 229-30.
35 18 USC § 2119.
36 Jones,526 US at 232-33.
37 See id at 234-39.
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Jones Court explained if a fact triggers significantly higher penalties,
then it is an essential component of the crime rather than a mere
sentencing factor.3 The HarrisCourt also used this method, explaining
that facts that only slightly increase a potential penalty faced by a
defendant should be sentencing factors as opposed to elements."
Fourth, the Court has considered legislative history. The Castillo
Court, for example, noted that the legislative history of the federal
firearms statute did not particularly favor treating carrying a machine
gun as a sentencing factor rather than an element." The Government
argued that the legislative history surrounding the machine gun
provision was focused primarily on new prison terms for different
weapons; but the Court noted that the primary provision, which
penalized carrying an unspecified firearm, also dealt primarily with
sentencing.41 In Jones, the Court also looked to legislative history but
found it unpersuasive, as various congressional statements had hinted at
the intention to treat serious bodily harm both as an element and as a
sentencing factor.42 In both cases, the Court examined the Congressional
Record from around the time of the statute's enactment and found
neither express nor implied intention to designate a fact as either a
sentencing factor or as an element." Finding no clear intention, the
Court effectively disregarded the legislative history prong of the test.
Finally, the Court has questioned whether treating a fact as a
sentencing factor would increase the risk of "potential unfairness."" In
Almendarez-Torres, the Court explained that recidivism could be
treated as a sentencing factor in part because putting a defendant's
criminal history before a jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt
would unfairly prejudice the trial." In contrast, the Castillo Court stated
that it would not be unfair to treat machine gun use as an offense
element under § 924(c), as the jury would already be presented with a
weapon during the guilt phase of the 924(c) trial." A defendant would
rarely need to argue, "I did not carry a firearm," and "[e]ven if I did
carry one, I did not carry that one." In both cases, the Court's primary
concern was whether putting a factor before the jury would complicate

See id at 233.
See 536 US at 554 (holding that brandishing a firearm was a sentencing factor in part because
the statute in question did "not authorize the judge to impose 'steeply higher penalties"').
4o See 530 US at 129-30.
41 See id.
42
See 526 US at 237-38.
43 See id at 238; Castillo, 530 US at 129-30.
44 Castillo,530 US at 127.
45 See 523 US at 234-35.
46 See 530 US at 127-28.
38

39
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the trial or prejudice the defendant." If so, then the Court preferred
saving the fact for finding by a judge during sentencing.
The Supreme Court has consistently used different combinations
of these five factors to draw the element-factor distinction, although
the method was neither an established test nor a bright-line rule.
Castillo, decided just before Apprendi, was the first case in which the
Court used all five factors in a sentencing factor determination." Still,
the Court did not treat the application of the five factors as a strict
test until United States v O'Brien," ten years later.so In the interim, and
before Castillo, the Court applied individual factors on an ad hoc
basis, using Apprendi as the primary mechanism for determining
whether a fact was a sentencing factor or an element." Apprendi,
discussed in Part II, remains the first test for whether a fact should be
an offense element or a sentencing factor." Once a court determines
that a fact does not increase the penalty for a crime beyond the
statutory maximum, however, the five-factor test comes into play."
This Comment argues that both standards favor treating drug quantity
as an element of § 841(b). In order to understand the argument, it is
important to analyze the statute itself Part I.B discusses the history
and text of § 841(b).
B.

The Statute

In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act

to
combat drug abuse and to enhance law enforcement authority in the
field of drug trafficking." The law, which initially assigned penalties
based on drug type, was amended in 1984 to create a schedule of
penalties based on the amount of a controlled substance that had been
4

47 See id; O'Brien, 130 S Ct at 2177 (borrowing Castillo's reasoning to hold that the machine
gun enhancement in a later version of §924(c)(1) was an element rather than a sentencing factor).
48 Castillo, 530 US at 124-31.
49
130 S Ct 2169 (2010).
50 See id at 2175-80 (explaining that the Castillo Court had considered five factors in
determining that using a machine gun was an element, and that in applying the factors again, it
reached the same conclusion). In his O'Brien concurrence, Justice Clarence Thomas referred to
the five factors as a "test." See id at 2184 (Thomas concurring).
51 See, for example, Harris,536 US at 552-56 (examining only statutory structure and the
degree to which a sentence was increased to determine that brandishing and discharging a
weapon were sentencing factors); Ring v Arizona, 536 US 584,609 (2002) (holding that Apprendi
required aggravating elements supporting the death penalty to be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt and applying none of the five factors).
52
See O'Brien, 130 S Ct at 2175.
53 See id.
54 Pub L No 91-513, title 11, 84 Stat 1242 (1970), codified as amended at 21 USC §801 et seq.
55 See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-513,
84 Stat 1236, codified in various sections of Titles 21 and 42. See also Gonzalez v Oregon,
546 US 243,250 (2006).
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manufactured, sold, or possessed with intent to distribute." Congress
continued this shift from punishment based on type of drug to
punishment based on quantity with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986"
(ADAA), which also established mandatory sentences for threshold
quantities." The goal of this shift was to focus scarce enforcement
resources on major traffickers; Congress assigned minimum sentences
based on quantities that it believed were associated with a powerful
position in a drug distribution organization."
The resulting statute, 21 USC § 841, sets out graduated penalties
for dealing in increasing quantities of drugs or drug mixtures:
(a) ... [I]t shall be unlawful for any person ... (1) to manufacture,
distribute ... or possess with intent to ... distribute ... a controlled
substance; or (2) to create ... or dispense ... a counterfeit

substance.
(h) . . . [Any person who violates subsection (a) of this section

shall be sentenced as follows:
(1)(A) In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section
involving ... 1 kilogram or more of ... heroin ... [or] ... 5 kilograms or
more of ... cocaine ... or ... 280 grams or more of ... [crack]; such
person shall be sentenced to ... not ... less than 10 years or more

than life.
(B) In the case of a violation . .. involving ... 100 grams . . . of
heroin ... [or] ... 500 grams ... of... cocaine ... or ... 28 gfdAs or

more of ... [crack] ... such person shall be sentenced to

.

not

... less than 5 years and not more than 40 years.
(C) In the case of a controlled substance in schedule I or II ...
such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not
more than 20 years.

56 See Controlled Substances Penalties Amendments Act of 1984 § 502, Pub L No 98-473,
title 11,98 Stat 1837,2068, codified as amended at 21 USC § 841(b).
57 Pub L No 99-570,100 Stat 3207, codified at 21 USC § 801 et seq.
58 ADAA § 1002, 100 Stat at 3207-2-3207-4. The Act also increased penalties for quantities
of drug mixtures, rather than merely the quantity of the pure drug involved. See ADAA § 1002,
100 Stat at 3207-2-3207-4; Chapman v United States, 500 US 453,461 (1991).
59 See Kimbrough v United States, 552 US 85,95 (2007).
60 Subsection (C) regulates unquantified drug amounts-that is, a detectible amount of a
substance is found, but is either smaller than the threshold quantities set out in subsection (B) or
was not found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
61 21 USC § 841 (2006 & Supp 2010). In 2010, the statute was amended to insert "280 grams"
and "28 grams" of crack in place of "50 grams" and "5 grams," respectively. See Fair Sentencing Act
of 2010 § 2,Pub L No 111-220,124 Stat 2372,2372.The previous ratios-5 kilograms of cocaine and
50 grams of crack under subsection (b)(1)(A); 500 grams of cocaine and 5 grams of crack under
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Circuit courts disagree over whether the drug quantities listed in
subsections (A), (B), and (C) are sentencing factors that can be
determined by a judge or elements that must be proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. In accordance with Apprendi, the central
inquiry in this determination is whether
the drug quantity increases
61
the defendant's maximum sentence. The circuits are split over two
issues: first, whether the minimum sentences of ten and five years set
out in subsections (b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(B) can be paired with the
maximum sentence of twenty years in subsection (b)(1)(C); and,
second, whether Apprendi applies only when an actual sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum based on facts found by a jury, or
whether any increase in a potential sentence beyond that statutory
maximum must also be protected by Apprendi. Part II discusses the
Apprendi rule and two later cases, Harrisand Booker, that apply and
expand upon Apprendi's reasoning.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON SENTENCING FACTORS:
APPRENDI,HARRIS, AND BOOKER

The element landscape changed with Apprendi. In the early
morning hours of December 22, 1994, Charles Apprendi fired shots
into the home of an African American family." After he was arrested,
Apprendi admitted both that he was the shooter and that, although he
did not know the occupants of the house personally, he had fired
because they were African American, and he did not want them in the
neighborhood. He later withdrew his statement.4 Based on that
incident, Apprendi pleaded guilty to second-degree possession of a
firearm with an unlawful purpose, which under New Jersey law carried
a maximum penalty of ten years. At the plea hearing, however, the
judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi had
acted with a racially biased purpose, in violation of a state statute that
carried a maximum penalty of twenty years. Based on that finding, the
judge sentenced Apprendi to twelve years in prison-two years
beyond the maximum authorized by the statute to which Apprendi
pleaded guilty.
The Court was faced with the question whether acting with a
racially biased purpose was an element or a sentencing factor." If it
subsection (b)(1)(B)-established the infamous 100-to-1 ratio for punishment of trafficking in
crack versus punishment for trafficking in cocaine.
62
See Apprendi, 530 US at 490.
63
Id at 469 (describing the circumstances of the crime).
64
Id.
65
Id at 469-71.
6
See Apprendi, 530 US at 471-72.
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were a sentencing factor, Apprendi's sentence could be upheld. But, if
it were an element, his sentence would have to be vacated, as the
enhancement had not been admitted by the defendant, charged in the
indictment, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.
The Court did not employ a five-factor test to make the
determination. Instead, it focused solely on the connection between
punishment and constitutional protection to determine that any factor
other than a prior conviction that increased the statutory maximum
for an offense was an element rather than a sentencing factor." The
Court explained that constitutional protections must attach to
penalties such as stigma and the loss of liberty." Under the statute at
hand, the defendant's maximum penalty would increase-from twenty
to thirty years-if the judge found that the defendant had acted with a
purpose to intimidate based on race." Because the defendant's
maximum penalty would be doubled, the Court reversed the New71
Jersey Supreme Court's affirmation of the twelve-year sentence.
Thus, the most important question after Apprendi is whether a fact
increases the statutory maximum for an offense. The five-factor
analysis that the Court used in Castillo is necessary only after it is
clear that a fact has not increased the statutory maximum without
being proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Apprendi left open the question whether statutory provisions
triggering mandatory minimum sentences would also have to be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Two years later, in Harris, the
Court answered in the negative." William Joseph Harris was convicted
of using a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in
violation of 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A)." The statute established a sevenyear mandatory minimum if the firearm was "brandished."" Harris
sold drugs out of his pawnshop, keeping an unconcealed
semiautomatic pistol next to him." In this case, brandishing the
firearm had no effect on the statutory maximum, as there was no set
statutory maximum for the offense." Still, Harris protested that the

See id at 476.
Id at 490.
69 Id at 483-84, citing In re Winship, 397 US 358,363 (1970).
70 Apprendi, 530 US at 469-70.
71 See id at 490.
72 Harris,536 US at 568 (plurality).
73
See id at 550.
74 Id at 551. Brandishing a firearm is defined as "display[ing] all or part of the firearm, or
otherwise mak[ing] the presence of the firearm known to another person, in order to intimidate that
person, regardless of whether the firearm is directly visible to that person." 18 USC § 924(c)(4).
75 Harris,536 Us at 550.
76 See 18 USC § 924(c)(1)(A).
67

68
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mandatory minimum triggered by the "brandishing" enhancement
violated Apprendi.
The Court held that the mandatory minimum did not violate
Apprendi, explaining that "[b]asing a 2-year increase in the
defendant's minimum sentence on a judicial finding of brandishing
d[id] not evade the requirements of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments."" The majority reasoned that the statute set out a single
offense, which included brandishing as a sentencing factor." The
plurality, joining in the holding, squarely confronted the Apprendi
issue, stating that a jury's role was to find all of the elements necessary
to support a maximum sentence." After that, a judge was free to
impose any sentence within the jury's authorized range, including a
mandatory minimum.so The Harris majority did examine some of the
traditional components that courts had looked to in distinguishing
between elements and sentencing factors," but the Court's primary
focus was on whether constitutional concerns, such as additional
punishment based on judge-found facts, were implicated." The
"brandishing" enhancement did impose a mandatory seven-year
sentence, but it did not increase the maximum sentence authorized by
a jury. As long as the enhancement did not exceed the sentence
authorized by the jury, the judge was free to assign a sentence within
the range already so authorized.
Harris was followed in short order by Booker." Freddie Booker
and Duncan Fanfan were convicted of possession with intent to
distribute crack and cocaine in violation of § 841(a)(1). The jury found
that Booker had possessed 92.5 grams of crack. This finding authorized
a maximum penalty of twenty-one years and ten months under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, which were mandatory at the time of his

77 Harris,536 US at 568.
See id at 556.
See id at 565 (plurality).
80 When a judge sentences the defendant to a mandatory minimum, no less than when the
judge chooses a sentence within the range, the grand and petit juries already have found all the
facts necessary to authorize the Government to impose the sentence. The judge may impose the
minimum, the maximum, or any other sentence within the range without seeking further
authorization from those juries-and without contradicting Apprendi. See id.
81 See Harris,536 US at 553 (noting that statutory construction supported treating the
provision as a sentencing factor); id at 554 (explaining that facts that only slightly increased a
potential punishment would more likely be sentencing factors).
82 See id at 552-53.
8 The Supreme Court decided Blakely v Washington, 542 US 296 (2004), between Harris
and Booker. Blakely invalidated Washington State's mandatory sentencing scheme and is
considered to have laid the foundation for Booker. See id at 305. Blakely is discussed in
Part IV.A of this Comment, but Booker is given a greater emphasis because the defendant in
Booker was charged with violating 21 USC § 841.
78
79
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sentencing.8 The Guidelines, which were created by the United States
Sentencing Commission to increase uniformity in federal sentencing,
effectively imposed a statutory maximum and minimum-a mandatory
Guidelines range-within the statutory maximum established by
Congress for any particular federal offense." Factors affecting a
Guidelines range could be found by a sentencing judge by a
preponderance of the evidence.
In Booker's case, the sentencing judge found by a preponderance
of the evidence that Booker had possessed an additional 556 grams of
crack cocaine and had obstructed justice. Those facts mandated a
Guidelines range of 360 months to life." Fanfan was convicted by a jury
of possessing at least 500 grams of cocaine. The maximum Guidelines
sentence for that amount was 78 months. At sentencing, the judge found
by a preponderance of the evidence that Fanfan had actually possessed
2.5 kilograms of cocaine powder and 261.6 grams of crack. He also
found that Fanfan had been an organizer of the criminal activity." The
additional findings prescribed a Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months.
The Supreme Court held that the Guidelines scheme violated
Apprendi, because it mandated increased statutory maximums based on
facts that had not been charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, or
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Thus, after the line of cases culminating in Booker, if a fact
increases the penalty beyond the statutory maximum, it is an element,
although facts that trigger mandatory minimum sentences do not
require the same protections as elements." But if a statutory scheme
allows judges to find by a preponderance of the evidence facts that
increase the statutory maximum, that scheme violates Apprendi."
The Supreme Court has never applied the traditional five-factor
test to drug quantity.' Lower courts also have not used a consistent
test to determine whether drug quantity is an element of § 841 or a
sentencing factor. Before Apprendi-but without consistently
applying the Supreme Court's five-factor test-circuit courts generally
treated drug quantity as a sentencing factor. After Apprendi, lower
8 See Booker, 543 US at 227-28.
as Id at 246 (stating that Congress intended the Guidelines to create uniformity in federal
sentencing).
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92
caused

Id.

Id at 227-28.
Booker, 543 US at 232-33.
See Apprendi, 530 US at 490; Harris,536 US at 568.
See Booker, 543 US at 233-34.
This Comment applies the five-factor test to drug quantity in Part V.C.
See United States v Gonzalez, 420 F3d 111, 123 (2d Cir 2005) (noting that Apprendi had
it to reconsider its former treatment of drug quantity as a sentencing factor);
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courts have used Apprendi to determine whether drug quantity is an
element-that is, the courts ascertain whether drug quantity increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum. Part III
demonstrates that lower courts have applied the Apprendi test in
widely diverging ways, with conflicting outcomes.
III. THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
Circuits are split over whether the drug quantities listed in
21 USC §841(b) are sentencing factors or elements. Recall that
§ 841(b)(1)(C) assigns a twenty-year maximum sentence for
unquantified amounts of drugs, subsection (b)(1)(B) assigns five to
forty years for intermediate drug amounts, and subsection (b)(1)(A)
mandates ten years to life for the largest drug quantities. Courts that
hold that drug quantity is an element do so because, as the quantity of
drugs increases, the maximum potential penalty increases from twenty
years under subsection (C) to life under subsection (A). In other
words, the sentence that a defendant may receive -the sentence that a
judge may legally impose-increases from twenty years to life.
Because drug quantity raises the maximum potential penalty above
the statutory maximum authorized by a jury, courts in the element
group hold that it is an Apprendi violation not to find drug quantity
beyond a reasonable doubt." In contrast, courts in the sentencing
factor group are concerned with the sentence that a defendant
actually received. They hold that no Apprendi violation occurs unless
the sentence that a judge actually imposes exceeds the statutory
maximum authorized by a jury.
The second component of the circuit split is whether a defendant
can face a maximum sentence of twenty years under subsection (C)
while simultaneously having a mandatory minimum from subsection
(B) or (A). Circuits that have held that drug quantity is not an
element permit this type of mixing and matching. For these courts, if a
defendant's actual sentence does not exceed the maximum set out in
(C), there is no Apprendi violation.
Working together, these two divergent methods produce different
outcomes for similarly situated defendants. To illustrate, compare the
outcomes in two real cases in which a defendant was convicted of
United States v Velasco-Heredia, 319 F3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir 2003); United States v Doggett,
230 F3d 160,164 (5th Cir 2000).
93 These courts are also concerned about a defendant's actual sentence exceeding the
statutory maximum, but the point of divergence is over whether a potential sentence is also
guarded by Apprendi. Also, since the statutory maximums under (b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C) are
forty years and life, respectively, it is rare that a defendant's actual sentence would, or could,
exceed those maximums.
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trafficking in crack and assigned a twenty-year sentence.- In neither
case did a jury find that the defendant possessed the quantity of drugs
corresponding to subsection (b)(1)(A) -the range according to which
the defendants were sentenced, which calls for a sentence of ten years
to life." In the First Circuit, which holds that drug quantity is not an
element, the court explained that the actual sentence of twenty years
did not exceed the statutory maximum available when no jury has
found a quantifiable drug amount-the twenty-year maximum under
subsection (b)(1)(C)." The court affirmed the sentence." But in the
Second Circuit, where the court is also concerned about the potential
sentence, the court vacated a defendant's twelve-year sentence,
explaining that the potential statutory maximum he faced (life) had
been increased by drug quantity, which had not been found by a jury.
A.

Drug Quantity Is an Element

The courts holding that drug quantity is an element of § 841(b)
emphasize that the statute's construction links drug quantity to the
length of imprisonment and that, under Apprendi, the sentencing
exposure faced by a defendant includes sentences that may be imposed,
rather than only sentences that have been imposed.
In United States v Gonzalez," the defendants pleaded guilty to
possession with intent to distribute fifty or more grams of crack." They
had arranged to sell crack to a confidential informant; when they
arrived at the designated location in Manhattan, Drug Enforcement
Administration agents arrived and the defendants fled. They were
arrested one month later. The corresponding mandatory minimum

94 See United States v Gonzalez, 420 F3d 111, 114 (2d Cir 2005); United States v Goodine,
326 F3d 26,28 (1st Cir 2003).
95 Gonzalez, 420 F3d at 115; Goodine, 326 F3d at 27. Due to a previous conviction,
Goodine was assigned a twenty-year statutory minimum. The normal statutory maximum would
have been ten years. See 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A); Goodine,326 F3d at 27.
96 See Goodine,326 F3d at 33.
9 See id at 33-34.
98 See Gonzalez, 420 F3d at 123 (remanding to allow Gonzalez to withdraw his guilty plea
after determining that quantity was an element). Compare also United States v Lizardo,
445 F3d 73, 88-90 (1st Cir 2006) (affirming a five-year mandatory minimum sentence under
subsection (b)(1)(B) based on an intermediate quantity of drugs found by a judge by explaining
that the five-year sentence did not exceed the twenty-year maximum set out in subsection
(b)(1)(C)), with United States v Velasco-Heredia, 319 F3d 1080, 1085, 1087 (9th Cir 2003)
(vacating a five-year mandatory minimum sentence under subsection (b)(1)(B) based on an
intermediate quantity of marijuana found by a judge, explaining that exposure to the greater
maximum sentence of forty years under subsection (b)(1)(B) meant that drug quantity, which
triggered the increased maximum, should have been found by a jury).
99 420 F3d 111 (2d Cir 2005).
o00See id at 114.
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sentence was twenty years."o Apprendi was decided just before
sentencing (but after his plea), so Manuel Gonzalez moved to withdraw
his plea because the drug quantity had not been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."2 Thirty years was the maximum amount of time that
could have been assigned to Gonzalez under § 841(b)(1)(C), so the
government argued that Gonzalez's "potential sentence"-the actual
sentence-of twenty years did not exceed the statutory maximum. 3
The Second Circuit rejected this argument on two grounds. First,
the court explained that the protections in Apprendi took effect before
sentencing rather than after the sentence was imposed.' In other words,
any fact that increased the potential sentence that a judge could impose
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The court
explained that any fact that would "expose a defendant to a greater
punishment than authorized by the jury's guilty verdict" must be
treated as an element.' Crucially, the insertion of a specific quantity of
drugs into a violation of § 841(a) triggered the punishments in
§ 841(b)(1)(A), which were higher than the penalty faced by a
defendant without the inclusion of quantity.'" Thus, the court explained,
drug quantity was always an element of 21 USC § 841.0'
The court also criticized the government's method of statutory
interpretation. It stated that § 841 could not be deconstructed to
render drug quantity an element for the purposes of determining a
statutory maximum but a sentencing factor for the purposes of
determining the statutory minimum. 00 That is, Gonzalez could not
have both a mandatory minimum of ten years (or twenty years in his
case, for a prior felony drug conviction)" under subsection (a)(1)(A)
and a statutory maximum of twenty years under subsection (a)(1)(C).
The court explained that the statute's structure precluded this type of
"mixing and matching"; each subsection contained a maximum
sentence linked to a minimum sentence, and the statute did not allow
any cross-referencing."o Thus, the court rebutted the contention that
Harris supported treating drug quantity as a sentencing factor, since

101 See id at 114-15. See also 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A) (setting out a mandatory minimum of
twenty years, rather than the usual ten years, for a defendant with a prior conviction for a felony
drug offense).
102 Gonzalez, 420 F3d at 115.
103 See id at 127. See also 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(C).
104 See Gonzalez, 420 F3d at 115.
105 Id at 123, quoting Apprendi,530 US at 494.
106 Gonzalez,420 F3d at 124.
107 See id at 130.
108 See id at 115-16.
109 See note 101.

110 See Gonzalez,420 F3d at 121.
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Harrispermitted statutory minimums based on facts found by a judge
by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 841 did not use drug
quantity only to increase the statutory minimum, but rather to trigger
both mandatory minimums and corresponding statutory maximums."'
The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion. In United States
v Promise,"' the defendant had supplied crack to a drug ring in
Gastonia, North Carolina. He was sentenced to thirty years'

imprisonment after the sentencing court found by a preponderance of
the evidence that the defendant had conspired to possess with intent
to distribute more than 1.5 kilograms of crack cocaine."' The
defendant appealed, asserting that the drug quantity should have been
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.". The Promise court
explained that the statute permitted an increase in the potential
penalty from the twenty years set out in § 841(b)(1)(C) to the greater
amounts articulated in § 841(b)(1)(A)-(B) only if drug quantity was
found by a jury. To comply with Apprendi, the drug quantity would
therefore need to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' In
this case, both the actual sentence of thirty years and the potential
maximum sentences of forty years (in subsection (B)) and life (in
subsection (A)) violated the Fourth Circuit's understanding of
Apprendi.

Turning to the question whether Apprendi applied before trial or
after sentencing, the Promise court noted that Apprendi had stated
that a fact that "increased the statutory maximum" did so whenever it
exposed the defendant to a penalty greater than the one that would
have been authorized by the jury's verdict alone."' Thus, the
sentencing judge was bound by the facts alleged in the indictment and
sent to a jury."' Like the Gonzalez court, the Promise court held that,
regardless of a defendant's actual sentence, drug quantity increased
the statutory maximum for the offense of drug trafficking and so had
to be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Promise court then implicitly rejected statutory mixing and
matching, explaining that the statutory structure in § 841(b) revealed
congressional intent to pair mandatory minimums and maximums.

III See id at 126.
112 255 F3d 150 (4th Cir 2001).
113 Id at 152-53. See also 21 USC §841(b)(1)(A)(ii).
114 Promise, 255 F3d at 153.
115 Id at 156-57.
116 See id at 157-58 n 7, citing Apprendi, 530 US at 482-83.
117 Promise, 255 F3d at 157-58 n 7.
118 See id at 159.
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"[Tihe penalty gradations," the court wrote, "are not the product of
constitutionally mandated procedures as a condition precedent to the
imposition of the maximum penalty, but rather are the result of
congressional prerogative to apply graduated penalties to acts of
increasing severity."... Congress was free to establish a single
maximum penalty to correspond to all of the mandatory minimums,
but it did not.20 Congress instead chose to make the penalties
conditional upon additional facts-drug quantities-and the
Constitution, as interpreted in Apprendi, controlled the process for
determining those additional facts."'
B.

Drug Quantity Is Not an Element

On the other hand, several circuits have held that drug quantity is
not an element of § 841 unless the actual sentence imposed is greater
than the statutory maximum for the offense of conviction -that is, the
statutory maximum authorized by the jury. They explain that the drug
quantities in § 841(b) trigger statutory minimums only, not statutory
maximums. For example, a quantity of one hundred grams of heroin
would trigger a statutory minimum of five years under § 841(b)(1)(B),
but the relevant statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes would be
the twenty-year cap set out in subsection (b)(1)(C), not the forty-year
cap in subsection (b)(1)(B). These courts hold that, even when the
statutory minimum is triggered by judicial fact-finding, the relevant
"statutory maximum" is the one found by a jury. Thus, if the jury did
not find a drug quantity, then the cap for an unquantified drug amount
applies (subsection (b)(1)(C)) at the same time a minimum is
triggered from elsewhere in the statute (subsection (b)(1)(A) or
(b)(1)(B)). In short, these courts imply that Congress authorized
courts to "mix and match" statutory maximums and minimums.
The Seventh Circuit explained its reasoning most thoroughly. In
United States v Clark,"' the defendant was sentenced to ten years in

119 Id.
120 See id.
121 See Promise,255 F3d at 159. Other courts have held similarly. See, for example, Velasco-

Heredia, 319 F3d at 1085 (concluding that the defendant's sentence violated Apprendi because
the district court determined only by a preponderance of the evidence that he had trafficked
more than fifty kilograms of marijuana); United States v Fields, 242 F3d 393, 395-96 (DC Cir
2001) (vacating the defendants' sentences based on the conclusion that quantity was an
element); United States v Doggett, 230 F3d 160, 164-65 (5th Cir 2000) (noting that Apprendi
compelled the conclusion that quantity was an element, notwithstanding the court's prior
precedent); United States v Hinshaw, 235 F3d 565, 575 (10th Cir 2000) (agreeing with Doggett's
reasoning and holding that drug quantity should have been found by a jury, but that the error
was harmless).
122 538 F3d 803 (7th Cir 2008).
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prison after he was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to
distribute, and the district judge found by a preponderance of the
evidence that the quantity he had possessed was fifteen kilograms.
The court rejected the defendant's argument that Apprendi prevented
judge-found facts from subjecting him to the mandatory minimum set
out in § 841(b)(1)(A)." This was, and remains, consistent with the
12
' Implicitly advocating statutory
Supreme Court's holding in Harris.
mixing and matching, the court then explained that the mandatory
minimum sentence that Clark was subjected to was below the
statutory maximum sentence that he would have been exposed to
based only on the facts found by the jury (that is, the twenty-year
maximum for unquantified drug amounts set out in § 841(b)(1)(C)).'"
The court stated that Apprendi applied only after a defendant
received his sentence: "Apprendi has no application where a drug
dealer is given a sentence at or below the maximum provided in
§ 841(b)(1)(C)."'. The court acknowledged the contrary holding in
Gonzalez but declared that it was not bound by it. In addition, circuit
precedent supported treating drug quantity as a sentencing factor.12
In United States v Washington,12 the Seventh Circuit reinforced
the holding and reasoning of Clark." The defendants were part of a
drug distribution ring called the "Bigelow boys," operating in a house
on Bigelow Street in Peoria, Illinois."' The court asserted that under
Harris, statutory minimums provoked by judge-found facts were
lawful.132 Thus, the judge could assign a twenty-year mandatory
minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A) for possession of more than fifty
grams of cocaine, but since that sentence did not exceed the thirtyyear statutory maximum under § 841(b)(1)(C), based on facts found

See id at 805,808. See also 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii).
See Clark, 538 F3d at 811-12.
125 See Part II.
126 See Clark, 538 F3d at 811.
127 Id at 812 (quotation marks omitted), quoting United States v Hernandez, 330 F3d 964,
980 (7th Cir 2003). See also United States v Abdulahi, 523 F3d 757, 760 (7th Cir 2008); United
States v Martinez, 301 F3d 860,864 (7th Cir 2002).
128 See Clark, 538 F3d at 812. See, for example, Hernandez, 330 F3d at 968; Abdulahi,
523 F3d at 760.
129 558 F3d 716 (7th Cir 2009).
130 Id at 720.
131 See id at 716.
132 See id at 720. See also United States v Krieger,628 F3d 857, 863 (7th Cir 2010); Martinez,
301 F3d at 864. The Seventh Circuit, echoing scholars and other courts, has expressed skepticism
about the holding in Harris on the basis that the defendant is "exposed" to greater penalties
when a mandatory minimum is imposed. See Krieger, 628 F3d at 864. See also Frank 0.
Bowman III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing
Reform, 58 Stan L Rev 235,261 & n 100 (2005).
123
124
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by the jury, Apprendi was not implicated.' The court did not provide
an explicit holding for the mixing-and-matching issue, since the
question of statutory interpretation had been neither briefed nor
presented before the court."4 But it explained in dicta that Harrisdid
not preclude Congress from linking a judge-found statutory minimum
to a jury-found statutory maximum. In the case of § 841, because
Congress did not write language into the statute requiring the pairing
of minimums and maximums that corresponded to the same drug
quantities, courts were not required to pair them together. While the
Gonzalez court had explained that the absence of express permission
from Congress to combine statutory maximums and maximums meant
that the method was forbidden, the Washington court took the
opposite stance: since the method was not expressly prohibited, it was
permitted.' This point of disagreement was pivotal, because the
Washington court, relying on earlier circuit precedent, noted that drug
quantity must be found by a jury when it increased the statutory
maximum sentence."' Using mixing and matching, however, the
statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes would never increase past
the term in (b)(1)(C) for an unquantified amount.
The Seventh Circuit has also looked independently at several of
the Castillo factors. In United States v Martinez,' the court explained
that statutory structure favored treating drug quantity as a sentencing
factor.8 Citing Harris,the court noted that when a statute contained a
principal paragraph and subparagraphs, elements were generally
contained in the principal paragraph-in that case, in § 841(a) rather
than in § 841(b)."'
In United States v Goodine,o the First Circuit used a similar
method to the Seventh Circuit's after conducting an extensive analysis
of Supreme Court precedent on the issue of sentencing factors versus
elements."' The court then discussed legislative history and historical
use, explaining that both factors favored treating drug quantity as a

133 See Washington, 558 F3d at 720. Subsection (C) sets a thirty-year, rather than the typical
twenty-year, maximum for dealing in unquantified drug amounts after a conviction for a prior
felony drug offense. 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(C).
134 See Washington, 558 F3d at 720.
135 See id.
136 See id at 719.
137 301 F3d 860 (7th Cir 2002).
138 See id at 865.
139 See id. See also Krieger,628 F3d at 865 (considering the language and structure of § 841
and finding that it favored treating facts in § 841(b) as sentencing factors).
140 326 F3d 26 (1st Cir 2003).
141 See id at 28-31.
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sentencing factor.4 2 The court explained that the statutory structure
included drug quantities in the penalty provisions, which were
typically the location for sentencing factors, and that drug quantity
was a "classic sentencing factor."' In addition, Congress passed § 841
at a time when, according to the court, it wanted sentencing courts to
have maximum flexibility.'" The Goodine court did not apply all five
factors from the Castillo opinion, which had been decided three years
earlier. Rather, consistent with the directive in Apprendi, it used
Apprendi as the primary test for whether drug quantity was a
sentencing factor. The court explained that the Supreme Court's ruling
applied only when a defendant's actual sentence exceeded the
statutory maximum based on jury-found facts.'45 Earlier in the opinion,
the court embraced mixing and matching, explaining that the jury's
determination would cap the statutory maximum under § 841(b) even
while a judicial finding could determine which subcategory's statutory
minimum applied."'

There is an equal number of circuits on each side of the circuit
split. Examining Supreme Court cases that have applied Apprendi
demonstrates that the circuits that have treated drug quantity as a
sentencing factor have erred. Part IV discusses the recent Supreme
Court cases and their application to § 841.
IV. TURNING THE Focus BACK TO THE SUPREME COURT
The circuit split implicates two critical aspects of criminal
procedure: the extent of Apprendi's due process protections and
142 See id at 31-32. Goodine draws a different conclusion about legislative history than this
Comment does in Part IVC.4, but Goodine was decided before Kimbrough, which discussed the
legislative history of 21 USC § 841(b).
143 Goodine, 326 F3d at 31-32.
144 See id at 31.
145 See id at 33.
146 See id at 32. Other courts have held similarly. See, for example, United States v Franco,
484 F3d 347, 356-57 (6th Cir 2007); United States v Serrano-Lopez, 366 F3d 628, 638 & n 9
(8th Cir 2004); United States v Vazquez, 271 F3d 93,98 (3d Cir 2001). The Eleventh Circuit has its
own method for determining whether drug quantity is an element of § 841. It has held only that
Apprendi is not implicated unless a defendant's actual sentence is above the statutory maximum
set out in the portion of § 841(b) under which he was sentenced. See United States v Underwood,
446 F3d 1340, 1344-45 (11th Cir 2006). No statutory "mixing and matching" is involved: "The
maximum term of imprisonment under 21 USC §841(b)(1)(A)(iii) is life ... [The defendant] was
sentenced to 135 months in prison, well below the statutory maximum. In a § 841 case where the
defendant's ultimate sentence falls at or below the statutory maximum [] in § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii),
there is no Apprendi error." Id.
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whether statutory minimums and maximums can be "mixed and
matched." This Comment argues that the Supreme Court has provided
guidance on both issues. First, Part IV.A outlines several of the Court's
opinions that apply Apprendi, arguing that they clarify that the
Apprendi Court was concerned both with actual and potential
sentences. Next, Part IVB argues that the Court has also shown its hand
on the question of statutory mixing and matching, clearly disfavoring it.
If courts are not permitted to combine statutory maximums with
statutory minimums, then a quantifiable drug amount above a certain
level in 21 USC § 841(b) will move both the minimum and the
maximum. When the statutory maximum is thus shifted, drug quantity
necessarily must be charged in the indictment, submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, Part IV.C argues that the
Supreme Court has indicated in recent opinions that the drug quantity
component of 21 USC § 841(b) would be an element under its
traditional five-factor test.
A.

The Future of Apprendi

Initially, the two competing interpretations of Apprendi appear
equally valid. After all, the language in Apprendi is ambiguous: "any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a
reasonable doubt."147 "Increases the penalty" can indicate either an
increased potential penalty, as the Second Circuit's side of the split
concludes, or it can indicate actual liability, as explained by the
Seventh Circuit and others.
There is good reason to believe that the Second Circuit's
approach is correct. First, the central holding in Harris is concerned
with potential exposure. The petitioner in Harris argued that
statutory minimums should be unconstitutional under Apprendi
because they force a judge to impose a sentence without finding the
triggering facts beyond a reasonable doubt.' In effect, he was arguing
that his actual sentence must be protected by due process. The Court
was able to hold that statutory minimums were constitutional after
Apprendi because the statutory maximum would still be justified by
facts found by a jury or admitted by the defendant. In the words of the
plurality, "The Fifth and Sixth Amendments ensure that the defendant
will never get more punishment than he bargained for when he did the

147

Apprendi,530 US at 490, citing Jones,526 US at 252-53.

148 See Harris,536US at 568-69.
149

See id.
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crime, but they do not promise that he will receive anything less than
that."O
When sentences are reviewed on appeal, courts-including the
Supreme Court-examine the sentence that was actually imposed to
determine whether that sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. But
the Court has gone further than merely invalidating individual
sentences. In cases where a sentencing scheme permits a judge to find
a fact that would increase a potential sentence beyond the statutory
maximum authorized by a jury, the Court has held that scheme
unconstitutional, first in Blakely v Washington,'' followed by Booker,
2 These holdings indicate that
and finally in Cunningham v California.'
the Court is concerned not only about an individual defendant's actual
sentence, but also with increased sentencing exposure.
After Harris,the Court further clarified the dual role of Apprendi
in three opinions that analyzed sentencing plans as a whole, rather
than just individuals' sentences. First, in Blakely, the Court faced
Washington's sentencing guidelines regime, which allowed a judge to
increase a sentence beyond the "standard range" if she found
"substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional
sentence."' Ralph Blakely Jr was convicted of second-degree
kidnapping and faced a standard range of forty-nine to fifty-three
months in prison.' The judge imposed ninety months based on a
finding that Blakely acted with deliberate cruelty." At the time, the
maximum sentence authorized for kidnapping, a class B felony, was
ten years. 6 The Court explained, however, that ten years was not the
"statutory maximum" beyond which Apprendi protections were
triggered.' Rather, the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes
was the maximum sentence that a judge could impose based only on
the facts admitted by the defendant or found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.' Because the Washington regime permitted a judge
to impose sentences beyond that statutory maximum, both Blakely's
sentence and the procedure that allowed it were invalid.'
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Booker, in which a
judge had sentenced Freddie Booker to thirty years in prison, but the
150

Id at 566.

151
152

542 US 296 (2004).
549 US 270 (2007).

153
154

Blakely, 542 US at 299.
See id.
See id at 300.
See id at 303.
See Blakely, 542 US at 304.
See id at 303.
See id at 304-05.

155
156
157
158
159
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maximum sentence authorized by jury-found facts was twenty-one
years, ten months.'6o The Court held that the Guidelines, which
mandated the judge's higher sentence, were no longer binding.' The
Court emphasized that its concern was that judge-found facts not only
could increase a defendant's actual sentence beyond the statutory
maximum, but also would increase the potential sentence that a
defendant faced. A jury must determine facts that "raise[d] a
sentencing ceiling.""
In Cunningham, the Court examined California's Determinate
Sentencing Law" (DSL). For the majority of offenses, the DSL
prescribed lower, middle, and upper terms of imprisonment and
required the sentencing judge to impose the middle sentence unless
there were aggravating or mitigating factors.'" Cunningham was
charged with the continuous sexual abuse of a child, an offense that
carried potential punishments of six, twelve, or sixteen years." The
DSL permitted the judge to find the facts that would trigger an upperterm sentence.'6 The Court held that Cunningham's sixteen-year
sentence was unconstitutional. Again, the Court articulated the
Apprendi guarantee in terms of a defendant's potential sentence:
"This Court has repeatedly held that, under the Sixth Amendment,
any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential sentence must
be found by a jury... and established beyond a reasonable doubt."
Accordingly, the Court did not limit its holding to Cunningham's
sentence. Rather, it held that the entire DSL was unconstitutional.
Cunningham, like Booker and Blakely, establishes that anytime a

sentencing statute allows a judge to find facts that would push a
sentence past the statutory maximum as found by a jury, the scheme is
unconstitutional.
If drug quantity can be found by a judge by a preponderance of
the evidence, then the penalty regime in § 841(b) is like the sentencing
schemes that the Court has found unconstitutional in Cunningham,
Blakely, and Booker. In §841, the maximum permissible penalty
increases from twenty years for an unquantifiable amount of drugs in
subsection (C), to a maximum penalty of forty years for a small
amount of drugs in subsection (B), to life in prison for a larger
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168

See Booker, 543 Us at 227.
See id at 245.
Id, quoting Jones, 526 US at 251-52 n 11.
Cal Penal Code § 1170 (West 1976), repealed by Cunningham, 549 US 270.
See Cunningham,549 US at 277.
See id at 275-76.
See id at 274.
Id at 281.
See Cunningham,549 US at 293.
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quantity of drugs in subsection (A). 69 Like California's DSL, § 841(b)
hinges an increase in a defendant's potential penalty to an aggravating
factor-in this case, drug quantity. Allowing a judge to find that factor
by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than requiring it to be
found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, is akin to the DSL's
permitting judges to find aggravating factors. As the Supreme Court
held in Cunningham, such a scheme is unconstitutional."o Courts
should take into account recent Supreme Court precedent and hold
that Apprendi violations occur when judge-found facts push either
actual or potential sentences past the statutory maximum.
B.

Statutory Mixing and Matching

Taken together, these ideas suggest that courts ruling on drug
quantity in § 841(b)-and courts ruling on Apprendi in general-should
apply due process protections both before trial and after sentencing. Yet
even a pre-trial application of Apprendi in all instances would not unify
the circuits' views about whether drug quantity is an element of § 841.
As long as Harris is good law and statutory mixing and matching is
permitted, courts can conceivably hold that drug quantity is a
sentencing factor triggering a statutory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A)
or (B), but one that invokes only the lower statutory maximum set out
in § 841(b)(1)(C).
As the Seventh Circuit noted in Washington, this method of
statutory interpretation is novel, and it has been neither explicitly
permitted nor outlawed."' But it is important to acknowledge that the
Supreme Court has treated the penalty clause of § 841 as setting out
mandatory minimums that cannot be severed from their statutory
maximums. In Booker, the Court wrote, "Having heard evidence that
he had 92.5 grams in his duffel bag, the jury found [Booker] guilty of
violating § 841(a)(1). That statute prescribes a minimum sentence of
ten years in prison and a maximum sentence of life for that offense.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)."7 The language that the Court chose suggests that
trafficking in larger amounts of drugs is a separate offense from
trafficking in smaller amounts of drugs: the singular act of possessing
92.5 grams of crack was connected to a sentence of 10 years to life."'
The Court did not state that there was a sliding scale for the offense of
2

16921 USC § 841(b).
170 See Cunningham,549 US at 293.
171 See Washington, 558 F3d at 720.
172 Booker, 543 US at 227.
173 See id.
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possessing drugs, but rather that there was a set maximum for the
offense of possessing more than a threshold quantity.'74
This treatment is similar to the Court's earlier analysis in Castillo,
where the Court analyzed the following provision: "Whoever, during
and in relation to any crime of violence ... uses or carries a firearm,
shall ... be sentenced to ... five years .. . and if the firearm is a machine
gun ... to ... thirty years.".' The Court explained that both the machine

gun provision and the firearm provision were contained in the principal
paragraph of the statute, and were followed by three numbered
subsections that pertained only to sentencing.16 The containment of
these two elements in the principal paragraph "strongly favored"
treating the machine gun provision as a new crime."7
Furthermore, in Kimbrough v United States," the Court treated

each subsection of § 841 as an independent whole. Writing for the
majority, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg rejected the Government's
argument that the ADAA mandated that Guidelines sentences be
higher for trafficking in crack, stating that the statute established
statutory minimums and maximums only for each drug quantity: five
to forty years for five grams or more of crack and ten years to life for
fifty grams or more.'79 The statute said nothing about the appropriate
sentences "within these brackets."" Justice Ginsburg argued that
Congress had established a fixed sentencing range for each drug
quantity, indicating that the range was bound by both a statutory
minimum and a statutory maximum. If the minimums and the
maximums could operate independently, then Kimbrough's bracket
analogy fails."'
Together, Booker and Kimbrough indicate that the Court
disfavors mixing and matching the statutory minimums and
maximums in § 841(b). Jones sheds some light on the justification for
treating each subdivision as an independent whole. In that case, the
Supreme Court analyzed a statute with a penalty provision similar to
§ 841(b)-the federal carjacking statute, 18 USC § 2119."" It mandated

179

See id (treating the crossing of the fifty-gram threshold as a discrete offense).
Castillo,530 US at 122, quoting 18 USC § 924(c) (1988 & Supp 1993).
See Castillo,530 US at 124-25.
See id.
552 US 85 (2007).
See id at 102-03.

1so

Id at 103.

174
175
176
177
178

181 As in Clark, where the court assigned the ten-year statutory minimum under 21 USC
§ 841(b)(1)(A) but maintained that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes was twenty
years under § 841(b)(1)(C). See Clark,538 F3d at 811.
182 See Jones, 526 US at 232-33 (analyzing the various subsections of § 2119 and claiming
that the subsections appear to be sentencing provisions).
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under subsection (1) that a defendant be sentenced to a maximum of
fifteen years in prison for stealing a car with a firearm.m
Subsection (2) established a maximum sentence of twenty-five years if
serious bodily injury occurred while stealing a car with a firearm.'
Subsection (3) increased the maximum penalty to life in prison if
death resulted from the underlying offense."' The Court noted that
each subsection included a higher penalty that was conditioned on an
additional fact.'" Critically, the Court explained that this pairing of fact
and consequence made each subsection of the penalty provision
operate independently." In this instance, the Supreme Court showed
how the separate penalty provisions should be read, suggesting that
separate clauses in sentencing provisions should be treated as
independent wholes where, as in Jones, a fact is paired with a
consequence. Just as in § 2119, the subsections of § 841(b) pair a fact
(drug quantity) with a consequence in the form of both a mandatory
minimum and a statutory maximum. Recall, for example, that
§ 841(b)(1)(B) assigns a sentence of five to forty years for certain
specified quantities of drugs.'" Lower courts should follow the
Supreme Court's method in Jones, Booker, and Kimbrough and, when
a fact is paired with a consequence, consider the pairing an indivisible
whole.
C. The Traditional Five Factors
Even after Apprendi, courts have used the traditional five factors
in considering whether a fact is an element or a sentencing factor.
Courts look to (1) historical use, (2) statutory structure, (3) the degree
to which a fact increases the potential sentence, (4) legislative history,
and (5) potential unfairness. Most recently, in O'Brien, the Supreme
Court explained that Apprendi was the primary arbiter of whether a
fact was a sentencing factor or an element.'" Once a fact passes
Apprendi's muster by not increasing a sentencing range without
submission to a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it is up to
Congress to determine whether a fact is a sentencing factor or an
offense element."' For example, stating that four of the traditional five
See 18 USC § 2119(1).
See 18 USC § 2119(2).
185 See 18 USC § 2119(3).
186 See Jones, 526 US at 233.
187 See id ("These not only provide for steeply higher penalties, but condition them on further
facts (injury, death) that seem quite as important as the elements in the principal paragraph.").
188 See 21 USC §841(b)(1)(B).
189 See, for example, Harris,536 US at 552-56; Goodine,326 F3d at 31-32.
190 O'Brien, 130 S Ct at 2174-75.
191 See id at 2175.
183
184
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factors favored treatment as an element, the O'Brien Court held that
the machine gun enhancement of 18 USC § 924(c) was an element
even though it did not increase the punishment for the offense beyond
the statutory maximum.
As indicated in Part IV.A and Part IV.B, courts should treat drug
quantity as an element of § 841 because Apprendi requires it. This
Section explains that, even under a traditional five-factor test, drug
quantity merits additional constitutional protections at trial. The
Supreme Court has not applied the five-factor test, as a whole, to drug
quantity. In cases where a defendant is charged with violating § 841,
however, the Court has discussed four of the five factors
independently. Combining this evidence with the Supreme Court's
language regarding a prospective application of Apprendi and
statutory mixing and matching further confirms that courts should
treat drug quantity as an element, rather than a sentencing factor.
1. Historical use.
Before Apprendi, circuit courts typically treated drug quantity as a
sentencing factor.' As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor noted in her
Blakely dissent, this reflected the historical use of drug quantity in
determining the sentence after conviction.19 Historical use can be a
difficult determination to make, however. Because of the relatively
short history of the distinction between offense elements and
sentencing factors, there is precious little precedent to render a
treatment genuinely "historical." 9. Drug quantity is also a relatively new
player in the sentencing landscape, suggesting that the factor's historical
use is still in flux. There is support for the argument that quantity,
specifically in the context of § 841(b), should be treated as an offense
element. In Kirnbrough,the Court explained that the scale of the drug
trafficking scheme was at the very heart of § 841(b) -and that the scale
was determined solely by the quantity of drugs trafficked.' The Court
explained that Congress had enacted the ADAA (the act that
elaborated and expanded the drug quantities in § 841) to link the fiveyear statutory maximum to "serious" drug traffickers and the ten-year
statutory minimum to "major" drug dealers.

See id at 2180.
See note 92 and accompanying text.
194 542 US at 318 (O'Connor dissenting).
195 See Nancy Gertner, What Has Harris Wrought, 15 Fed Sent Rptr (Vera) 83, 85,
87 & n 28 (2002).
196 See Kimbrough, 552 US at 95.
197 See id.
192

193
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In Castillo, the Court explained that Congress typically made
characteristics of the offender into sentencing factors and
characteristics of the particular offense into elements.'" For example, a
traditional "offender characteristic" is recidivism, which the Court has
held to be a sentencing factor." Other traditional offender
characteristics include cooperation with law enforcement and
acceptance of responsibility (both of which can lead to a reduced
sentence).M In contrast, an "offense characteristic" is a fact that lies
"closest to the heart of the crime at issue."2 ' The Court explained that
using a machine gun, instead of a pistol, to commit a crime of violence
was the type of offense characteristic that effectively transformed the
offense into something new.202 The larger, more violent weapon
amplified the scale of the crime.203 Likewise, drug quantity escalates
the scale of the crime under § 841, rendering it either "serious" or
"major."24 This connection to the nature of the particular offenserather than to the offender -suggests that drug quantity under § 841
should be treated as an offense element instead of a sentencing factor.
2. Statutory structure.
When the Supreme Court analyzes statutory structure looking for
congressional intent, it looks to whether Congress appeared to create
a separate offense. The Court has explained that, when a relevant fact
appears in a separate subsection from the other elements, it is more
likely a sentencing factor than a sentencing element. For example, in
Jones, the Court stated that the fact that the statute included a
principal paragraph with elements followed by numbered subsections
with various sentences favored treating any enhancement in the
subsection as a sentencing factor.2 The converse is also true, as when,
in Castillo, the Court explained that the "machine gun" enhancement
appeared in the same sentence as "uses or carries a firearm," the
principal elements, which cut in favor of treating it as an element.
198 See Castillo, 530 US at 126. See also Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense
Conduct and Offender Characteristicsin Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 Stan L Rev 277, 277
(2005) (arguing that "[h]istorically, offense conduct ... and offender characteristics ... have both
played a significant role in sentencing," but that the Supreme Court has recently given "great
attention to offender characteristics at sentencing").
199See A lmendarez-Torres,523 US at 230.
200 See O'Brien, 130 S Ct at 2176.
201 Id, quoting Castillo, 530 US at 127.
202 See Castillo,530 US at 126.
203 See id.
204 See Kimbrough, 552 US at 95.
205 See 526 US at 232-33.
206 Castillo,530 US at 124-25.
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The statute at issue in this Comment, § 841(a), sets out the
principal elements of possessing or trafficking narcotics, while
§ 841(b) establishes sentences attached to the quantities of narcotics
8 was one instance in which the
trafficked.2 07 United States v Cottonm
Supreme Court explicitly analyzed the structure of § 841 after
Apprendi.The Cotton Court examined an appeal from two defendants
who had been sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment under
§ 841(b)(1)(A) based on a drug quantity that had been found by a
judge by a preponderance of the evidencea The Court reasoned that
Congress had designed § 841(b) to separate different levels of drug
traffickers from one another at sentencing.210 The Court explained that
"[iun providing for graduated penalties... Congress intended that
defendants ... involved in large-scale drug operations receive more

severe punishment than those committing drug offenses involving
lesser quantities." 21" The subsection structure suggests that drug
quantity should be a sentencing factor.
There are two indications, however, that this second factor does
not weigh heavily against treating quantity as an element. First, in
O'Brien, the Court explained that the fact that enhancements
appeared in subsections should not be the deciding factor in the
element-sentencing factor determination, particularly where
conditions existed that pointed the other way. Second, the O'Brien
Court explained that breaking lengthy statutes into subsections that
are easier to read is consistent with good congressional practice and
not necessarily an indication of intent.

207 See 21 USC §841(a)-(b) (2006 & Supp 2010) (establishing an elaborate system of
criminal penalties for trafficking heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and other drugs, where penalties
depend on quantity, drug type, and prior convictions).
208 535 US 625 (2002).
209 See id at 628. Without ruling on the issue of whether drug quantity was an element, the
Court noted that it was plain error not to allege drug quantity in an indictment under 21 USC
§ 841(b)(1)(A), since drug quantity increased the statutory maximum for the offense. None of
the circuit courts ruling on the question whether drug quantity was a sentencing factor or
element used Cotton in its reasoning. Rather, circuit courts have used Cotton for its primary
holdings, which were that a defective indictment did not necessarily deprive a district court of
jurisdiction, and that Apprendi errors could be subjected to a three-pronged plain error review.
See, for example, United States v Portes, 505 F3d 21, 25-27 (1st Cir 2007) (explaining that the
Apprendi error had not been properly preserved, and so review was for plain error under the
Cotton test); Wadlington v United States, 428 F3d 779,785-86 (8th Cir 2005) (holding that failure
to allege drug quantity in the indictment, an Apprendi error, was not plain error).
210 See Cotton, 535 US at 634.
211 Id.
212 See O'Brien,130 S Ct at 2180.
213 See id at 2179-80.
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3. Degree to which a fact increases the potential sentence.
Twice, the Court has commented that the degree to which drug
quantity can increase a potential sentence should trigger the
additional protections of Apprendi. First, the Blakely Court lamented
that, under § 841, a defendant's maximum sentence could increase
from five years for a small amount of marijuana or hashish under
subsection (b)(1)(D) to life in prison for a large amount of a drug like
cocaine under subsection (b)(1)(A).2 MThe Court used this example to
illustrate that large increases in potential sentences merit the
additional due process protection of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
211
standard. In Booker, the Court also examined a case in which a
defendant was charged with, and convicted of, violating § 841(a).
While the jury found that Booker had possessed 92.5 grams of crack,
and therefore could be sentenced under the sentencing guidelines to
twenty-one years and ten months in prison, the judge found that he
possessed an additional 556 grams of crack and sentenced him to
thirty years.21 The Court was concerned that Booker had received a
significantly higher sentence due to a fact found by a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence.21 This large increase is akin to the
sentencing increments in Jones, which the Supreme Court held could
not be based on judge-found facts.218 Based on the Supreme Court's
recent jurisprudence, the third factor favors treatment of drug
quantity as an offense element.
4. Legislative history.
There is no legislative history that directly addresses whether
Congress intended drug quantity in § 841(b) to be an element or a
sentencing factor.' When the Supreme Court analyzes legislative
history in the absence of express intent, it looks to whether Congress
directly paired a fact with a new prison term. In Castillo, for example,
the Court wrote that legislative statements about assigning an
additional prison sentence for using a machine gun rather than merely
using a generic firearm, indicated that the provision might be an

Blakely, 542 US at 311-12.
See id.
216 See Booker, 543 US at 226.
217 See id at 238.
218 See Jones, 526 US at 233 (explaining that the penalty range would increase by two-thirds and
therefore should be protected by due process). See also Mullaney v Wilbur,421 US 684,698 (1975).
219 See Promise,255 F3d at 156 ("No legislative history speaks to the question."). See also
Goodine, 326 F3d at 31; United States v McAllister, 272 F3d 228,231 (4th Cir 2001).
214
215
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offense element.22 The firearm law's supporters noted that the bill
included "stiff mandatory sentences for the use of ... machine guns

and silencers" and "would have many benefits, including the
expansion of mandatory sentencing to those persons who use a
machine gun in the commission of a violent crime."221
Advocating for the ADAA, Senator Joseph Biden asserted that
the legislation would establish mandatory minimum penalties for the
highest level of drug traffickers.222 As noted in Part IVC.2, the
Kimbrough Court discussed this intent to punish top-level drug
traffickers more harshly, linking mandatory minimums of five and ten
years to "serious" and "major" drug traffickers.2' Congress was also
particularly concerned with the problem of crack cocaine, establishing
in the ADAA a 100-to-1 ratio between the punishment of crack
offenses and the punishment of cocaine crimes." Trafficking in any
quantity of crack carried a new penalty, while for the first time
mandatory minimum sentences attached to threshold quantities of
crack and other drugs.225 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the
legislative history of § 841(b) is rooted in the connection of largerscale drug offenses to larger mandatory penalties. This is similar to the
connection made in Castillo between using a machine gun and higher
26
penalties, indicating that the Court would likely analyze the
legislative history of § 841 to favor treating quantity as an element.
5. Potential unfairness.
In one passage in Blakely, the Court explained that allowing a
defendant to face a maximum of life in prison under § 841(b)(1)(A),
based on a drug quantity that had been found only by a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence, was fundamentally unfair.22 The Court
was particularly concerned about the judge's method of finding a fact
that could increase a sentence so dramatically, criticizing the scheme
220 See Castillo, 530 US at 130 (rejecting the government's claim that the legislative history
necessarily supported the conclusion that firearm type was a sentencing factor and explaining
instead that "the legislative statements that discuss a new prison term for the act of 'us[ing] a
machine gun,'. . .seemingly describe offense conduct, and, thus, argue against (not for) the
Government's position") (emphasis in original).
221 Id.
222 132 Cong Rec S 26439 (Sept 26, 1986) (Sen Biden) ("This legislation ... increase[s]
penalties for most drug-related offenses, including a mandatory minimum penalty of 10 years
imprisonment, and up to life, for the highest level of drug kingpins.").
223 See note 196.
224 See Kimbrough, 552 US at 94-95. See also 132 Cong Rec at S 26435 (cited in note 222)
(Sen Chiles) (discussing enhanced penalties for crack cocaine in particular).
225 See Kimbrough,552 US at 95.
226 See notes 175-77 and accompanying text
227 See Blakely, 542 US at 311-12.
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under which a defendant could face life in prison "based not on facts
proved to his peers beyond a reasonable doubt, but on facts extracted
after trial from a report compiled by a probation officer who the judge
thinks more likely got it right than got it wrong."m' In that instance, the
Court was concerned about the extent to which a defendant would be
prejudiced by treating quantity as a sentencing factor, due to the lower
standard of proof it required.
This is consistent with earlier Supreme Court opinions that have
established the unfairness prong as one focused primarily on prejudice
to the defendant. In Almendarez-Torres, the Court explained that
treating recidivism as a sentencing factor reduced the potential for
prejudice to the defendant, because a defendant's criminal history
would therefore not be put before the jury. 9 In contrast, the O'Brien
Court explained that treating the machine gun enhancement as an
element would not prejudice the defendant, because it would reduce
the potential for conflict between the judge and the jury.' Specifically,
treating the machine gun enhancement as a sentencing factor might
allow the jury to find that a defendant used a pistol while allowing a
judge to find that he had used a machine gun-a conflict that would
deprive the defendant of a fact-finding jury.23 1 In Booker, Justice John
Paul Stevens expressed a similar concern: modern sentencing had
begun to allow judges, rather than juries, to find an increasing number
of facts that enhanced a potential sentence.m The jury's role in finding
the underlying offense elements was thus less significant. Restoring
the central role of the jury was the only way to "preserv[e] an ancient
guarantee under a new set of circumstances."m Under this analysis,
drug quantity should be treated as an element, bringing the jury right
that designation requires.

Four of the five factors that the Supreme Court traditionally uses
to distinguish elements from sentencing factors favor treating drug
quantity as an element of § 841(b). Historical use, the degree to which
a fact increases a sentence, potential unfairness, and legislative history
Id.
See Alrnendarez-Torres, 523 US at 234-35.
230 See O'Brien, 130 S Ct at 2177.
231 See id. See also Castillo,530 US at 128.
232 See Booker, 543 US at 237 ("The new sentencing practice forced the Court to address
the question how the right of jury trial could be preserved, in a meaningful way guaranteeing
that the jury would still stand between the individual and the power of the government under
the new sentencing regime.").
233 Id.
228
229
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all suggest an element interpretation. Statutory structure cuts the
other way, but the Court has explained that statutory structure should
not be the final arbiter of the distinction between sentencing factors
and elements.2? In O'Brien, the most recent Supreme Court opinion
on point, the Court held that four out of five factors was enough to
justify treating a fact as an element.m
CONCLUSION

Apprendi implicates critical constitutional rights. The circuit split
over whether drug quantity is an element of 21 USC § 841 indicates
that the Apprendi opinion did not go far enough toward clarifying
these rights. A close analysis of recent Supreme Court precedent
indicates that the courts favoring treatment of drug quantity as an
element are correct: Apprendi must be read to apply to both potential
sentences and actual sentences. In addition, while statutory mixing and
matching may be permissible, the Supreme Court disfavors it. Finally,
even the traditional five-factor analysis favors treating drug quantity
as an element rather than as sentencing factor. Future courts
interpreting § 841 should take note and should assign drug quantity
the constitutional protections that both Apprendi and the Court's fivefactor test require.
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See O'Brien, 130 S Ct at 2180. See also Harris, 536 US at 553;Jones, 526 US at 232.
See O'Brien, 130 S Ct at 2178,2180.

